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Abstract 
This paper examines the questions of whether and how feudal rulers were able to 
credibly commit to preserving monetary stability, and of which consequences their 
decisions had for the efficiency of financial markets. The study reveals that princes were 
usually only able to commit to issuing a stable coinage in gold, but not in silver. As for 
silver currencies, the hypothesis is that transferring the right of coinage to an 
autonomous city was the functional equivalent to establishing an independent central 
bank. An analysis of market performance indicates that financial markets between cities 
that were autonomous with regard to their monetary policies were significantly better 
integrated and more efficient than markets between cities whose currencies were 
supplied by a feudal ruler. 
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1. Introduction 
On March 1, 1412, the joint rulers of the small North German duchy of Brunswick-
Lueneburg, dukes Otto and Bernard, concluded a contract with their city of Brunswick. 
Neither the cause nor the content of that treaty were at all unusual at this time. The 
dukes had followed a tradition common in many parts of late thirteenth and fourteenth 
century Germany (cf. Hävernick, 1931): They had held yearly recoinages, withdrawing 
the old money from circulation to exchange it at a heavy discount – in their case of 25 
percent – for newly minted coins. In effect, they had pursued a rather drastic policy of 
capital taxation. Now, in 1412, they agreed to abolish this practice. Henceforth, the 
burghers and magistrates of Brunswick would have the exclusive right “to make and 
manufacture coins at which time and in whatever quantity they deem to be fit, and with 
whatever mark and sign may seem convenient to them, which coins shall be current and 
acceptable in all our lands of Brunswick… The mint shall for ever be and remain to be 
in the free ownership of our faithful subjects, the council and burghers of our city of 
Brunswick”. A little later it transpired that the city had paid almost 4000 marks of silver 
– that is, nearly 1 ton – for this privilege (Jesse, 1924, pp. 35 f.). 
The contract between the dukes and the city of Brunswick highlights a problem that 
occupied practically all rulers in the Holy Roman Empire at the close of the Middle 
Ages and at the beginning of the early modern era: whether, and if so, how to preserve 
monetary stability. 1  On the one hand, there were strong motives for discretionary 
behaviour, that is, for tolerating no restraints on the princely right to debase the coinage. 
Given a limited supply of bullion (which in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth 
century actually may have been shrinking, c.f. e.g. Day, 1980/87; Munro, 1983; but see 
Sussman, 1998, for a dissenting view), such debasements – i.e., reductions of the gold 
or silver content of the coinage – were the only way of how the nominal quantity of 
money could be extended. Modern governments may pursue comparable policies, 
hoping to reduce unemployment or trying to depreciate the real value of government 
debts (Barro and Gordon, 1983, pp.102 f.). In late medieval Germany, rulers had other 
motives. Due to the stickiness of nominal prices, they were able to make a short term 
profit from seignorage, which they might need for any number of political or personal 
reasons (such as wars or marriages, which actually were both political) (cf. Cipolla, 
                                                 
1  At this time, there were about 500 mints in operation in Germany (Sprenger, 2002, p. 81). The number 
of currencies was somewhat smaller but still large. 
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1963, p. 414). Nominal prices would only begin to rise in the medium term, when 
consumers noticed that the currency was being debased (Sussman, 1993; Sussman and 
Zeira, 2003). On the other hand, rulers were aware of the fact that monetary instability 
was harmful, or, as the dukes of Brunswick-Lueneburg put it, they realised “the 
manifold, lamentable and great damages that we, our subjects … and people … suffered 
and continue to suffer due to the aforementioned recoinages, and because there is no 
stable and lasting penny current and usual in our land of Brunswick”. In particular, the 
dukes noticed “that many merchants avoid our lands with their merchandise, because of 
the loss which they must bear and suffer due to those selfsame pennies [i.e. those 
hitherto minted], which does great damage to our customs revenues and also to our 
other affairs” (Jesse, 1924, p. 35). Hence, there were also incentives to accept 
restrictions and to follow some rule that would help to establish long-term confidence in 
the coinage.2 
The starting point of the analysis below is that fundamentally, the problem that late 
medieval rulers had to solve was one of credibility: If they wanted to prevent revenue 
losses due to the exit of the owners of mobile factors of production such as merchants, 
they had to convince consumers that they would not only for the moment supply a 
stable currency, but would also continue to do so in future. The passage from the 
contract between the dukes of Brunswick-Lueneburg and the city of Brunswick, which 
was quoted above, shows that they realised that being able credibly to commit to 
safeguarding monetary stability would in the long run increase their income, at the same 
time helping economic performance.  
There are, of course, several ways of how money affects the economy. Having a 
standardised unit to measure the value of commodities and using a general means of 
exchange saves transaction costs. This, in turn, is in itself important for the size of the 
market, the division of labour and for productivity gains due to specialisation. However, 
money can fulfil this function only if its purchasing power is secured (Kasper and Streit, 
1999, p. 211). Consumer expectations with regard to the future value of the monetary 
units they hold affect the demand for money, the willingness to spend and to invest. 
                                                 
2 The vast literature on the “rules versus discretion” issue originated with an article by Kydland and 
Prescott (1977), who showed that due to time inconsistencies, it is unlikely that an optimal policy can 
be implemented. Some years later (1980), they extended their model with the aim of making it 
possible to define a benchmark optimal policy with which to compare the time consistent but almost 
necessary suboptimal actual policy. The literature is surveyed by Ireland (2002). 
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Studies on the influence of central bank independence on economic performance show 
that in particular in less-developed countries, there is a close correlation between 
monetary stability and economic performance (Cukiermanet al., 1993). Hence, the 
creation of stable price expectations can be seen as a long-term investment by 
politicians involved in the supply of money. However, as Klein (1974, p. 449) pointed 
out, particularly politicians whose positions are not secure and whose time horizon is 
comparatively short face strong incentives not to undertake this investment.  
The present article examines the question of if and how late medieval rulers managed to 
solve this problem, that is, of whether and by which means they were able to commit to 
preserving monetary stability. The study follows Shepsle’s (1991, pp. 247 ff.) 
distinction between motivational and imperative credibility. A commitment is 
motivationally credible when subsequently, that is, at the time of performance, the 
person who committed himself wants to honour that commitment. Put differently, it is 
credible in the motivational sense because it is incentive-compatible and therefore self-
enforcing. On the other hand, a commitment is imperatively credible if the committee is 
unable to act otherwise. In this case, credibility is given not because of 
contemporaneous preferences but rather because there is a regular and predictable 
mechanism that is used to sanction non-performance. Shepsle’s distinction is useful as a 
heuristic means that makes it possible to ask the appropriate questions and to structure 
the historical material. In actual fact, however, there was a fluid transition between both 
forms of commitment. It is one of the hypotheses of the present paper that the 
alternative was not just rules versus discretion, but that under certain circumstances, 
which need to be examined, even formally unconstrained authorities had an incentive to 
preserve monetary stability (cf. Barro and Gordon, 1983). 
The paper proceeds in two steps. First, in section 2, the mechanisms of credible 
commitment available to late medieval rulers are examined. Here, motivational 
credibility is examined first. Where and in how far imperative credibility really differed 
from it will become obvious when it is discussed subsequently. In the second step 
(section 3), the analysis explores the consequences of credible commitment to monetary 
stability for the efficiency of financial markets. Here, a new approach to estimating 
financial market efficiency in general and financial market integration in particular is 
used. The final section (4) contains a summary of the findings of this study. 
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2. Committing to stable money 
2.1. Motivational credibility 
Commitment situations are fundamentally instances of exchange based on explicit or 
implicit contracts. In today’s models, the exchange takes place between a policy maker 
who is responsible for the supply of money, and consumers who demand it and who pay 
taxes in return. For the supplier, reneging on the contract means setting an inflation rate 
that exceeds the consumers’ expectations. For the consumers, it means evading taxes or 
simply exiting the policy maker’s jurisdiction. The situation is structured like a 
prisoners’ dilemma, and as it is repeated and the time horizon is infinite, the actors’ 
interest in their reputation is sufficient to allow a cooperative equilibrium to emerge, if 
the policy maker’s discount factor is high enough (Barro and Gordon, 1983, pp. 108 ff.; 
Lohmann, 1998, pp. 9 f.). 
Medieval conditions differed in a number of important respects from modern ones. As 
mentioned above, feudal rulers could reap short-term windfalls from increasing the 
seignorage, their incentive to renege being thus more direct and personal than that of 
policy makers today. Medieval consumers, on the other hand, had in principle more 
options than their modern counterparts if they wanted to defect or to put pressure on a 
ruler whose defection they had observed. Apart from evading taxes, they could attempt 
to evade customs or simply refuse to accept the currency that was locally provided, 
which in effect meant to exit to a different supplier (cf. Hirschman, 1970). In order to 
examine how viable these alternatives were, it is useful to briefly turn to the position of 
the rulers, which was summarised by Schumpeter (1991, p. 102): 
“The fourteenth- and fifteenth-century prince … was confronted by the solid position 
of the estates, that is primarily the nobility of various degrees, to a lesser extent the 
clergy, still less the burghers of the towns, and finally and least important, the 
remains of free peasantry…. The position of the prince … consisted merely of a sum 
of the rights of dukes, counts, various feudal officials, land-owners, etc., as did the 
rights of all other land- and relatively independent allodial lords…. The prince 
owned his sum of rights and positions of power for his own benefit…. So far as the 
economy of the prince was concerned, it followed that he had to meet all the 
expenses of any policy which was his private affair….” 
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Given these conditions, any feudal ruler who wanted to raise taxes, which they 
increasingly tried in the fifteenth century, needed not only the consent of his estates, but 
also their cooperation that had to make up for the lack of an administrative apparatus of 
his own. Consequently, raising taxes was so expensive that they played a minor role in 
the budget of most late medieval territorial lords. Customs revenues were more 
important, in particular in the western regions of the Empire that straddled the great axis 
of European trade between Italy and the Netherlands (Droege, 1966, pp. 153, 157). 
Evading customs, however, was difficult: Usually customs posts were not positioned on 
the vaguely defined borders between territories but at places that were costly to 
circumvent, such as river crossings, mountain passes or ports. Whether customs evasion 
was possible depended on geographical and political conditions; other things being 
equal, trade would find it the easier to avoid a territory the smaller it was (the duchy of 
Brunswick-Lueneburg was evidently small enough). 
The third option, the refusal to accept a ruler’s money, gives a different picture. Because 
of the transaction costs savings that the use of money involved, consumers would not 
have been willing to give up using money altogether, but would have looked for 
substitutes for their local currency. If their actual or threatened exit to some other 
supplier of money was to enable the local ruler credibly to commit himself to preserving 
monetary stability, a number of preconditions needed to be given. In the first place, 
substitutes had to exist, that is, there had to be competition in the money supply. 
The competitive supply of money has been extensively discussed in the literature on 
monetary theory (Klein, 1974; Hayek, 1976). While older analyses claimed that money 
can not be supplied under conditions of unregulated laissez-faire without leading to an 
infinite price level, i.e. to hyperinflation, Klein (1974, pp. 426 f.) showed that this view 
was based on the implicit assumption that firms would produce identical and 
undistinguishable forms of money. If each supplier would instead produce a distinct and 
distinguishable currency, and if these circulated side by side at flexible market exchange 
rates, there would not be one general price level but rather several levels in terms of the 
particular currencies. Conditions in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Central Europe 
closely corresponded to Klein’s model. At that time, any kind of bullion-based money 
was in principle acceptable anywhere, at the discretion of the consumers. For example, 
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Bohemian silver groats were widely used all over Poland and Prussia,3 while coins 
jointly minted by the Hanseatic cities of Luebeck, Hamburg, Lueneburg and Wismar 
were current not only in their home towns and in the region in between, but in all North-
Western Germany (Stefke, 1995, p. 126). Gold, in particular, often circulated far from 
home. Thus, in the fourteenth century, the Florentine florin was used all over Western 
Europe (Berghaus, 1965), while the Hungarian ducat played a similar role in East-
Central Europe (Huszár, 1970-72). In the fifteenth century, the rhinegulden, struck by 
the archbishops of Cologne, Mainz and Trier and by the Count-Palatine on the Rhine, 
was current in practically all Germany (Weisenstein, 2002). 
The production and side-by-side circulation of distinct types of money is a necessary 
but not a sufficient condition for competition between currencies to allow rulers 
credibly to commit to monetary stability. As Hayek (1976, pp. 58 ff.) pointed out, 
consumers must be well-informed about the purchasing power of the monetary units of 
the various currencies that circulate at the same time. If this is not the case, they are 
unable to choose between currencies and to select the one with the highest purchasing 
power for their day-to-day transactions. Under modern conditions, where information 
costs are low and fiat money dominates, this requirement may arguably be fulfilled by 
e.g. placing different and easily distinguishable price tags on the goods consumers 
demand. However, under late medieval conditions – characterised not only by the use of 
commodity money, but also by high information costs – matters were more 
complicated. Under such conditions, the costs consumers had to bear in order to acquire 
information about their alternatives were often prohibitive, and most importantly, they 
were not the same for all agents on the market.  
In models that capture modern conditions, consumers are usually assumed to be 
homogeneous, meaning that all are equally able to assess the value of the money 
supplied by the policy maker and to detect his defection (cf. Barro and Gordon, 1983). 
A similar assumption is often made with regard to the Middle Ages. Rolnick et al. 
(1996), for example, claim that consumers were aware of the intrinsic value of money, 
which they used by weight. However, late medieval conditions rather suggest a rough 
distinction between two groups of agents (cf. Sussman and Zeira, 2003, pp. 175 f.). On 
the one hand, there was the majority of the population: people who were illiterate and 
                                                 
3  An early fifteenth-century source from Prussia states that “according to the [Bohemian] groat, any 
merchant determines the price of his commodities in gold and silver” (Töppen, 1878, p. 266). 
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probably did not handle money on a day-to-day basis. As coins circulating at that time 
were not marked with their nominal values, and as even those belonging to the same 
currency and having the same nominal value were not exactly identical, these 
consumers tended to value all monetary units at 1:1 that looked superficially similar and 
had roughly the same weight. Put differently, they used money by tale. On the other 
hand, there was a small group of agents, not only professional moneychangers, but also 
merchants, who went by weight, that is, who had the specialised knowledge to 
distinguish those units whose content of bullion was higher and to withdraw them from 
circulation. In 1539, the council of Hamburg gave a vivid description of how such 
practices endangered the local currency. Here, it was Danish small change that was 
difficult to distinguish from the money jointly issued by the cities of Luebeck, 
Lueneburg, Wismar and Hamburg, whose council complained that  
“several burghers and inhabitants of this city bring whole tons and sacks of 
underweight three- and sixpenny pieces and other coins from outside into this city, 
and use these to buy up and export the cities’ good shillings, talers, mark pieces and 
other good coins, thereby looking for their own advantage and acting against the 
common weal, to the detriment of all good money” (Bollandt, 1960, p. 322).  
Gresham’s law, that is frequently claimed only to hold for monetary units whose 
exchange rates are legally fixed (Hayek, 1976, p. 35), could therefore operate on the late 
medieval money market even when no political authority tried to impose exchange 
relations. Consequently, despite the side-by-side circulation of different currencies, 
suppliers of money could behave as if they had a monopoly and as if consumers had no 
exit option. Under these conditions, rulers could hardly credibly commit to monetary 
stability. 
There was one final important difference between medieval conditions and those 
assumed in modern models: Today, each central bank supplies just one distinct currency. 
In late medieval Germany, this was not necessarily the case. Many rulers did not only 
provide silver money, but additionally gold. Both circulated side by side (usually at 
flexible rates), but they fulfilled different functions and were demanded by different 
(though partly overlapping) groups of consumers. Gold was predominantly used by 
merchants active on international markets and in long-distance trade, while silver 
dominated small-scale exchange and local markets (Spufford, 1991, p. 283). As long-
distance merchants were better informed about monetary standards than the average 
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customer on local markets, having a good notion of the fine gold content of the coins 
struck by rulers, they could refuse to accept gold-based currencies that they regarded as 
instable. Information on devaluations being easily accessible to the small number of 
persons involved, reputation should have been sufficient as a mechanism to ensure the 
rulers’ compliance with the implicit contracts that linked them and the merchants. Put 
differently, it should have been easier for rulers to commit to the preservation of 
monetary stability where their supply of gold was concerned. This hypothesis is 
supported by the data shown in figure 1. 
Fig. 1: Debasement of gold and silver, index (earliest documented value = 100) 4 
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4 The data on which the figure is based are accessible at http://www2.wiwi.hu-
berlin.de/institute/wg/volckart/hist_data.html. 
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The graphs indicate that while silver currencies were occasionally reinforced, gold was 
much more stable. The four gold units included, i.e. the English noble, the Florentine 
florin, the Hungarian ducat and the rhinegulden, suffered a yearly loss of on average 
about 0.1 percentage points of their original gold content. By contrast, the silver 
currencies, that is, the pounds of Flanders, Holland and Vienna, the schocks of groats 
from Bohemia and Meissen, and the mark of Prussia, lost c. 0.5 percentage points of 
their silver content per year. This confirms the argument made above, i.e. that feudal 
rulers were much better able to commit to monetary stability where gold was concerned. 
Here, their commitment was motivationally credible: They themselves were interested 
in issuing stable units of gold because the most important group of consumers – 
merchants who used this gold in international transactions – were able at low costs to 
acquire information about changes in the standard of the coinage, and to refuse to accept 
debased gold. Thus, in contrast to modern conditions, where reputation-based 
cooperative equilibria can emerge, in the late Middle Ages this was possible only to a 
limited extent, i.e. only as far as gold was concerned. 
2.2. Imperative credibility 
While in most parts of Europe gold dominated long distance commerce, there were 
regions where it was used sparingly. English gold nobles, for example, did penetrate the 
Baltic area – as did other types of gold coins notably from France and the Netherlands – 
but here, silver was used more often in long-distance commerce (Spufford, 1991, pp. 
282 f.). In North Germany, merchants kept using stamped silver ingots in parallel to 
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silver groats from France, Bohemia or Meissen for large scale transactions well into the 
fifteenth century (Jesse, 1952, pp. 39 ff.). And everywhere international merchants, who 
were accustomed to using gold in transactions among themselves, had to handle silver 
when they did business with local traders or engaged in retail sale. Hence, the 
importance silver money had for large-scale and long-distance commerce should not be 
underrated. 
As a matter of fact, the difference between commitment regarding the issue of stable 
silver and gold was not fundamental but rather one of degree. Merchants who used 
silver for large-scale transactions could react to the supply of debased units of this metal 
just as they could react to the supply of debased gold. They could, for example, evade 
customs, as in the relatively small duchy of Brunswick-Lueneburg at the beginning of 
the fifteenth century. Still, on its own the fact that merchants, who were unhappy with 
the money supplied by the local ruler, did have an exit option was insufficient to enable 
the dukes to commit credibly to preserving the stability of their silver money. In such 
cases, the group of consumers using the coins was not only larger than in the case of 
gold, but consisted of different actors, i.e. of individuals who were unable to distinguish 
coins with a high content of fine silver from debased pieces. Consequently, a ruler who 
reneged on his implicit contract with the consumers, that is, who secretly reduced the 
standard of the silver coinage, would still be able to find buyers for his inferior product. 
Under such conditions, reputation would not be an effective enforcement mechanism, so 
that he had to find a way to bind himself if he wanted to credibly commit to monetary 
stability. 
Involving an independent authority in the management of the currency was the solution 
most feudal rulers came up with. Thus, in 1380 the grandmaster of the Teutonic Order 
that ruled Prussia decided to introduce a formalised procedure of control, which was 
supposed to increase confidence in the coinage he produced in his mint at Thorn: “And 
if the burghers were present at the inspection and emission of the money we would be 
pleased to see that, so that in all things one might be the surer and more certain” 
(Volckart, 1996, p. 396). Further west, urban rights of control had been established 
earlier, going in some cases back to late antiquity (Berghaus, 1964, p. 77; Nau, 1964a, p. 
145, cf. table 1 below). A ruler who granted such rights did not directly commit himself 
to preserving the established standard of the coinage, but rather to publicising any 
changes of this standard. In other words, urban control of a princely mint was a means 
of spreading information about whether the ruler reneged on the implicit contract 
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between him and the consumers who used his money. Due to this information, 
reputation could function as a commitment device, allowing individuals, who otherwise 
would not have been able to detect clandestine debasements, to credibly threaten to exit 
to a more reliable supplier.5 This, in turn, gave the rulers an incentive to comply with 
the contract. Hence, granting rights of control to the cities allowed princes to commit to 
monetary stability, even though their commitment was indirect and probably relatively 
weak. 
A more credible commitment required stronger measures, i.e. the establishment of an 
authority that was not only independent and had the right to supervise the coinage, but 
that could take over the entire management of monetary policies. This is the solution 
chosen by the dukes of Brunswick-Lueneburg in 1412. As usual in the Middle Ages, 
they did not create a costly new bureaucratic apparatus but made use of an organisation 
that already existed: They transferred the right to emit their currency to the largest and 
most influential city within their territory. Giving up their right to meddle with the 
coinage was the strongest conceivable means to restrict their future scope of action. The 
dukes would not only never again have the chance to profit from debasements, but 
would also acquire a strong interest in monetary stability – after all, some of the coins 
struck by Brunswick would find their way into their coffers through the payment of 
customs and other dues. In fact, transferring the right to issue the currency to an 
independent body, such as a town, was functionally the equivalent of establishing an 
independent central bank. Of course the huge differences between conditions in the 
Holy Roman Empire in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries and e.g. England in the late 
seventeenth century, where the first independent central bank was created, need to be 
given due consideration. Still, the mechanism analysed above allowed late medieval 
rulers credibly to commit to monetary stability in much the same way as the foundation 
of the Bank of England allowed the English government to commit to the repayment of 
its debts (cf. North and Weingast, 1989). 
Still, this solution to the credibility problem posed two problems of its own, both of 
which have parallels under modern conditions. For one thing, as Lohmann (1998, p. 11) 
pointed out: “If the policy maker cares strongly about the future, she can directly 
commit herself to the ex ante optimal monetary policy path. So why would she bother 
                                                 
5  Milgrom, North and Weingast (1990) show that in the absence of third party enforcement, facilitating 
the spread of information about defaulters allows agents on otherwise anonymous markets credibly to 
commit to contracts. Cf. Greif (2005, pp. 733 f.). 
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making institutional commitments…?” In other words: where is the difference between 
committing to upholding monetary stability in the first place and committing to 
respecting the independence of the central bank – or, in the present case, the exclusive 
urban right of coinage –, once this has been established? Political actors in the late 
Middle Ages were fully aware of this problem. Thus, when dukes Otto and Bernard of 
Brunswick-Lueneburg concluded their contract with the city of Brunswick, they had to 
promise that neither they themselves nor their “heirs and successors (would) … set up, 
hold or have another mint, nor allow others to do so in any way in our lands of 
Brunswick” (Jesse, 1924, p. 35). However, in the absence of any effective third party 
enforcement, what mechanism ensured that the dukes complied with this clause of the 
contract? In fact here reputation was again crucial, allowing public commitment to a 
rule (Lohmann, 1998, p. 15). This commitment would be effective even though the 
supply of silver was concerned, and the number of consumers was greater and their 
ability to acquire information smaller than in the case of the issue of gold. The 
difference was that once an exclusive minting right had been transferred to a city, any 
defection by the ruler would be much more obvious. If the ruler, being the only local 
supplier, clandestinely reduced the standard of his silver coinage, most consumers 
would realise this only after some time. By contrast, if a ruler, having renounced his 
right of coinage in favour of a city, began to issue money again, even illiterate 
consumers would notice this – except, of course, in cases where the ruler’s coins were 
so close imitations of those struck by the city that he was, in effect, committing an act of 
forgery. Still, even then he had to buy the necessary raw materials, which would raise 
distrust if he did it locally, or involve high costs if he tried to import them on his own. 
Thus, the transfer of the right of coinage from a feudal ruler to a city amounted to the 
establishment of a mechanism that would make information about the ruler’s defection 
readily available, thus allowing him credibly to commit to respecting the stability of the 
local silver coinage.6 
Dukes Otto and Bernard were not the only feudal rulers to transfer the right of coinage 
to a city within their territory (cf. Berghaus, 1964). Table 1 and the map on page 16 
(both of which do not claim to be comprehensive) give an impression of how often this 
expedient was used. In the table, cities frequently appear several times due to the fact 
                                                 
6  There is a broad literature on the importance of information for the establishment of cooperative 
equilibria in prisoner dilemma situations. Important contributions were made by Kreps et al. (1982) 
and Milgrom, North and Weingast (1990). 
 14
that they began by acquiring either temporarily or functionally limited rights relevant 
for the supply of a currency, later leasing the mint, and only in the last stage definitely 
buying it. The fact that cities were prepared to pay for their privilege was of course an 
additional incentive for rulers, since it made the sale of the right of coinage doubly 
attractive, especially when being in need of short term funds. 
Table 1: Urban takeovers of minting rights (Nau, 1964b, pp. 148 ff.; Jesse, 1952; Volckart, 1996). 
  temporary minting right (pledge, lease) indefinite minting right (purchase) 
period urban control of standard granted by the king granted by a prince from the king from a prince 
1225-1249 Constance, Hanover, 
Strassburg, Hameln 
 Schaffhausen, Zuerich, 
Worms (for 10 years) 
Luebeck (for silver), Hall  
1250-1274 Cologne Altenburg, Stade, Augsburg (for 
3 years), Oppenheim (for 10 
years) 
  Stade 
1275-1299 Brunswick Augsburg, Constance (for 10 
years) 
Strassburg (for 4 years), 
Hamburg 
Goslar Lueneburg and the estates 
of Brunswick-Lueneburg, 
Strassburg 
1300-1324 Hildesheim, Bremen Schaffhausen, Lindau, 
Strassburg 
Hamburg, Brunswick  Salzwedel, Hanover and the 
estates of Brunswick-
Lueneburg, Kiel 
1325-1349 Erfurt, Halle Frankfurt (for silver) Zuerich, Brunswick Schongau, Luebeck (for gold), 
Speyer (for heller) 
Hamburg, Greifswald, 
Anklam, Stralsund, 
Rostock, Northeim, Stettin 
1350-1374 Nuremberg, Rottenburg, 
Dillingen, Stuttgart, 
Goeppingen, Oettingen 
 Mainz, Bremen, Basle Breslau (for heller) Rottweil, Goettingen 
1375-1399 Thorn  Solothurn Colmar (for pennies), Hall (for 
pennies), Ulm (for pennies) 
 
1400-1424 Frankfurt (for gold) Frankfurt (for gold), 
Noerdlingen (for gold) 
Ueberlingen, Lindau Ulm (for shillings), Lucerne, 
Fribourg, Nuremberg 
Einbeck, Brunswick 
1425-1449   Thorn (for 10 years), Danzig 
(for 10 years) 
Zuerich, Frankfurt, Lueneburg, 
Hamburg, Ravensburg, Jena, 
Hildesheim 
Hameln 
1450-1474  Graz Helmstedt Thorn, Danzig, Elbing  
1475-1499    Cologne, Constance  
1500-1524    St. Gallen, Worms, Rottweil, 
Kempten, Ratisbon, Augsburg 
 
1525-1549    Donauwoerth, Kaufbeuren, 
Bremen 
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Urban rights of coinage
(cf. Berghaus 1964) 
13th century
14th century
15th and early 16th century
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The second problem that emerged with the transfer of the right of coinage concerns the 
reliability of the central bank, that is, under medieval conditions, the behaviour of the 
magistrates of a city that had been granted a mint. The question is under which 
conditions such an independent body would itself be willing to commit to monetary 
stability (cf. Ireland, 2002, p. 10). It might seem that the transfer of the right of coinage 
would just amount to moving the commitment problem to a lower level. After all, urban 
councils faced similar incentives to debase the currency, frequently suffering from 
raising expenditures and accumulating deficits (Berghaus, 1964, p. 83; Dhont, 1964, pp. 
354 f.). To be sure, they were not immune to the lure of debasements. However, 
committing to the preservation of monetary stability posed a less serious problem to 
councils than to princes. For one thing, most councils were dominated by patrician elites 
that were composed either of merchants or of ex-merchants who had acquired landed 
property, living off rents paid by their peasants. Export-oriented producers who might 
have been interested in devaluations were usually not represented (Wensky, 2002). 
Therefore, the members of most councils would not individually have benefited from 
the circulation of debased money. Also, in contrast to a feudal ruler, none of them could 
have made a personal profit by increasing the seignorage. Furthermore, because it was 
not a single actor such as a prince who decided about monetary policies, but rather a 
group of people, the costs of making decisions about changes of the standard of the 
coinage were comparatively high. Finally, urban councils had to take the mood of their 
citizenry into account. Unpredictable and violent reactions to the decisions concerning 
the coinage would hit them much more directly than they would hit a feudal prince, 
living safely in his castle. This is what happened in Brunswick in the later fifteenth 
century, when the council took some drastic measures in monetary policies. The 
consequence was a large-scale uprising where the rioters chanted “mint master – head 
off” (Bote, 1880, p. 427). Thus, here too, reputation was at the heart of the matter. 
To summarize, there were several mechanisms which should have allowed councils 
credibly to commit to the preservation of monetary stability – more credibly than 
princes, at any rate. Urban currencies should consequently have been more stable. 
Ignoring cases where cities just had the right to supervise princely mints, and 
concentrating on the distinction between currencies issued by feudal and urban 
authorities, the data suggest that this was indeed the case. 
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Fig. 2: Debasement of currencies issued by feudal and urban authorities (index, earliest 
documented value = 100)7 
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7  The data on which the figure is based are accessible at http://www2.wiwi.hu-
berlin.de/institute/wg/volckart/hist_data.html. 
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There were of course many more Central European authorities who issued their own 
currencies, but as yet information on changes of the monetary standards is too scanty to 
provide more than the sketch presented above. According to these data, feudal silver 
currencies lost on average about 0.49 percentage points of their content of bullion per 
year. By contrast, urban currencies lost only about 0.37 percentage points. The 
difference is not nearly as large as the one between gold and silver, which was discussed 
above. Still, market performance suggests that contemporaries at least assumed that 
transferring the right of coinage to a town would help to stabilise the currency. This 
issue is the subject of the following section. 
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3. Urban monetary autonomy and the efficiency of financial markets 
3.1. The Method 
If granting the right to issue the currency to a city was functionally equivalent to 
establishing an independent central bank, as was suggested in the previous section, the 
consequences for the efficiency of financial markets – that is, of markets where agents 
traded either currencies or substitutes for hard money, such as bills of exchange – 
should have been similar: Markets should have been more efficient in cities that could 
pursue their own monetary policies than in cities whose policies were determined by 
some feudal lord. The efficiency of pre-modern financial markets is rarely analysed in a 
quantitative way. Neal (1985; 1987), for example, examined early eighteenth-century 
English and Dutch stock markets. Schubert (1988), who used exchange rates and fees 
paid for bills of exchange, managed to extend the analysis into the late seventeenth 
century. As it is usually assumed that due to the paucity of data, it is impossible to go 
further back in time, most authors who discuss earlier times confine themselves to 
making qualitative statements (Denzel, 1996). 
However, there is a simple approach to this issue which suggests itself under a 
commodity money system such as that which existed in late medieval Germany and her 
neighbours. This approach draws on the literature on market integration, starting out 
from the assumption that a better integration of financial markets is evidence of a higher 
degree of efficiency. Integration studies commonly make use of the law of one price (cf. 
Kindleberger, 1989, pp. 67 ff.). They are based on the comparison of prices paid at 
different localities, treating prices that are similar or that at least move in step with each 
other as indicators of well-integrated markets, whereas spreads between prices indicate 
a lack of integration. This approach can be used in the present context because late 
medieval merchants tended to treat money just as any other commodity. A telling 
description of how they profited from arbitrage on the money market is given in a 
treatise written by the chronicler Hermen Bote from Brunswick, where in the late 
fifteenth century ill-advised council measures set off a speculative craze. According to 
Bote, 
“the merchants were the first to take up this occupation: They traded and bought 
money for money or goods that were bullion and silver, and in this way became 
exceedingly rich people, until at last the common burghers learned this trade, too: 
whoever had a good silver penny or a gulden of full weight solely looked for his 
 21
advantage. Until at last the peasants, too, learned this, so that no good penny, groat 
or gulden would stay in circulation: whenever one appeared it was withdrawn” 
(Bote, 1880, p. 410). 
Bote described an extreme case, but profiting from arbitrage on financial markets was 
common in the late Middle Ages. In fact, the Holy Roman Empire with its large number 
of currencies provided an almost ideal environment for such transactions. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, account books kept by merchants or political authorities and 
other sources contain an abundance of exchange rate notations which can be used in 
order to examine how efficient financial markets were. This can be done by combining 
data on exchange rates between currencies based on gold and silver with data on the 
monetary standards in order to determine local gold-silver ratios. When these ratios are 
interpreted as prices paid on local financial markets, the approach based on the Law of 
One Price can be used: Gold-silver ratios which were similar between several localities 
indicate well-integrated markets, whereas differences between local ratios show that 
opportunities for arbitrage existed that were not exploited, the market being 
consequently relatively inefficient.  
The problems involved in this approach have elsewhere been discussed in detail 
(Volckart, 2006, pp. 14 ff.). Here it is therefore sufficient to briefly summarize them and 
to show how they can be solved. To turn first to exchange rate notations, it should be 
pointed out that they were based on several types of transactions (cf. Spufford, 1986, 
pp. l f.): The most elementary one was manual exchange, that is, the simultaneous and 
on the spot exchange of coins of different currencies. A more sophisticated kind of 
exchange made use of bills, which developed during the high Middle Ages. And finally, 
there were official rates that were determined or imposed by political authorities not 
only for domestic, but occasionally even for foreign gold. A broad literature exists 
where such rates, particularly those based on the nominal values of domestic gold coins, 
are used as a basis for calculating gold-silver ratios (e.g. Watson, 1967; Lane and 
Mueller, 1985, pp. 324 f.). Harry Miskimin (1985/89, pp. 148-51) forcefully argued 
against this approach, claiming that Renaissance princes were seldom able to enforce 
the circulation of their gold at its nominal par value. Hence, politically imposed 
exchange rates are excluded from the analysis, whose focus is on market rates. 
As for exchange rates found on bills, two points should be noted. On the one hand, they 
may contain a hidden interest rate. Hence, there may be a systematic difference between 
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them and the rates paid in manual exchange (cf. de Roover, 1968, pp. 32 ff.). On the 
other hand, it has sometimes been claimed that already by the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries, bills and other credit instruments constituted an important part of the money 
supply (Henning, 1981). If this was the case, their bare existence would have influenced 
rates of exchange. Still, as long as bills were not freely negotiable, their prices was not 
completely independent from manual exchange rates. There is no evidence that the 
endorsement of bills was practised in anywhere in Germany in the fourteenth, fifteenth 
or early sixteenth centuries; in fact, negotiability was a development of the seventeenth 
century. Apart from this, too few bills of exchange are preserved to make it possible to 
identify a systematic difference between exchange rates stated on them and those based 
on manual exchange. Hence, it seems acceptable to use all quotations indiscriminately. 
A more serious problem is posed by the ambiguity and lack of clarity of the sources. 
Often enough, the merchant or official or whoever authored the document, where the 
quotation is found, did not bother to clearly define which kind of gold coin the 
exchange rate actually applied to. Changes of the standard of the gold or silver coinage, 
also present a problem. If an exchange took place shortly after such an alteration, it is 
often impossible to determine whether the coins that changed hands were newly minted 
or had already circulated for some time. Here, the same assumptions were made as in 
Nikolaus Wolf’s and the author’s (2006) recent paper about silver exchange rates: 
Debased coins dominated circulation more quickly than re-enforced ones, and older 
coins continued to circulate abroad for a longer time than at home, where they had been 
minted. 
Even if it is known which types of coins were exchanged, it is difficult to determine 
their content of specie. The principal class of sources that contain the relevant 
information are mint ordinances and contracts concluded between the authority that 
issued the coins and the mint master. Usually, such documents defined the fineness of 
the alloy from which money was to be coined, and the number of coins to be drawn 
from a specified quantity of that alloy. They could be straightforwardly interpreted if it 
were not for several obstacles. For one thing, in some cases there is no clarity about the 
exact metric equivalents of the units of weight used between the fourteenth and 
sixteenth centuries. For another, the ability of medieval and early modern mint 
technicians to make chemically pure gold and silver has been questioned (Miskimin, 
1963, p. 31; Jesse, 1928, p. 160). The latter problem is important because in some cases 
it is not clear whether the fineness prescribed in an ordinance applied to the finished 
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coin that was anyway alloyed with some quantity of base metal, or to the specie which 
was to be used in manufacturing the coin before the base metal was added. The 
assumption made in this study is that the ordinances and contracts determined the 
fineness of the finished coins. This approach is acceptable because no mint master of 
the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries could rely on being able to manufacture coins that 
exactly met the prescribed standard. The pieces were struck ‘al marco’, that is, mint 
officials checked that a random sample of them held the prescribed total weight, 
regardless of variations among the individual coins. This alone makes it impossible to 
exclude a margin of error when the bullion content of late medieval and early modern 
coins is determined. 
A final problem is posed by the fact that, once in circulation, money became worn down 
and defaced. For silver, losses due to wear and tear have variously been estimated to lie 
between 2 and 2.75% per decade (Mayhew, 1974, p. 3) and between 0.25 and 0.87% per 
year (North, 1990, p. 108). Although losses and wear and tear influenced the amount of 
specie in circulation, and therefore probably affected the price level, as far as exchange 
rates are concerned, their effect was less important. Presumably, coins made of both 
metals suffered alike from defacement, so that its effects on gold and silver cancelled 
each other out.8 Still, for this reason, too, a margin of error is unavoidable. 
Fortunately, there is a group of sources that helps to minimise such errors. Many late 
medieval and early modern authorities had foreign money assayed more or less 
regularly (cf. Ropp, 1878, pp. 223 f.; Cahn, 1895, pp. 169 ff.; Munro, 1972, p. 212 ff.). 
The interpretation of medieval assays is, of course, problematic due to uncertainty about 
the metric equivalents of ancient units of weight, but if these sources are checked 
against the results of modern chemical tests (cf. Grierson, 1981; Kubiak, 1986), it is 
possible to derive a clear enough picture of how much gold and silver really changed 
hands when money was exchanged. 
When all problems involved in determining the specie content of the coins in circulation 
have been solved, it is necessary once again to turn to the way prices of gold and silver 
coins developed. Some of them, for example the Florentine Florin, the English Noble or 
the Hungarian Ducat, were more popular than others, so that buyers were willing to pay 
                                                 
8  Gold may have suffered less from wear and tear than silver. The hardness of both metals is about the 
same (2.5-3), but as the purchasing power of gold was higher, gold coins circulated slower. On the 
other hand, silver was more often alloyed to a higher degree with base metals, a practice which 
increased the hardness of silver money. 
 24
a premium. Hence, gold-silver ratios that are determined for one place, but on the basis 
of different types of coins are not necessarily alike. There are two ways to solve this 
problem: Either, and this applies to the fourteenth century for which data are scarce, the 
yearly mean value of all ratios that can be found is established. Alternatively, when 
circulation was dominated by a single type of gold coin, as for example in Hamburg 
since the middle of the fifteenth century when the Rhinegulden was the most popular 
type of gold, the yearly ratios based on this are used and all others are ignored. 
The analysis presented in the next section is based on c. 6100 exchange rate quotations 
– i.e. gold-silver ratios – from altogether 25 cities, most of which lay in the Holy Roman 
Empire. Some were in neighbouring countries such as France, Flanders, England, 
Prussia and Poland, but were linked by strongly frequented trade routes or intensive 
exchange relations to cities within the empire.9 Theoretically, 25 cities give 300 city-
pairs between which spreads between gold-silver ratios can be measured. As the 
analysis covers 210 years, the earliest observation being from 1352 and the latest from 
1562, there should be a total of 63,000 observations. However, there are only a few 
cities where the sources yield so many exchange rate notations that the time series are a 
more or less unbroken: Cologne, Basle, Hamburg, and some other places where the 
series extend at least over a couple of decades, such as Schaffhausen or Nuremberg. 
Hence, the number of city-pairs is reduced to 176 and the number of yearly observations 
of exchange rate spreads to c. 2000.10 
3.2. Analysis and Results 
The hypothesis tested in this section is that markets between cities, which could 
themselves determine their monetary policies, were better integrated and hence more 
efficient than markets between cities whose policies were determined by a feudal lord. 
In order to show how it is possible to undertake this test, it is useful briefly to consider 
the approach described above from a slightly more formal point of view.  
The exchange rate of some type of gold coin sold at a specified locality L for silver 
money can be defined as 
G
S
L C
kC
E = , where k represents the nominal sum in some silver 
                                                 
9  Amsterdam, Antwerp, Avignon, Basel, Bremen, Bruges, Cologne, Constance, Danzig, Elbing, 
Freiburg, Gnesen, Hamburg, Koenigsberg, Leiden, London, Luebeck, Lueneburg, Marienburg, 
Nuremberg, Reval, Schaffhausen, Stuhm, Thorn and Vienna. 
10  The data are accessible at http://www2.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/institute/wg/volckart/hist_data.html. 
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currency (CS) which equalled one gold coin (CG). The par ratio between gold and silver 
is given by 
GC
SkC
R
G
S
L = . Here, S is the silver equivalent of the unit of account to which 
the silver coins belonged, i.e. the amount of silver contained in the notional unit of 
reckoning (usually the pound or mark). G is the fine gold content of the gold coin. A 
local gold-silver ratio is the average of the par ratios found per year (i.e. RL’), subject to 
the restrictions described in the previous section. Spreads between such aggregates are 
therefore given by '' LnL RR −=Δ . As shown above, large spreads indicate weakly 
integrated and inefficient markets, whereas small spreads show that the markets where 
the ratios were measured were well-integrated and efficient.  
In the model which is used to test the hypothesis, the logarithm of these spreads is the 
dependent variable. Among the independent variables, an autonomy-dummy variable 
takes first place. This dummy takes the value of 1 if both cities between which the 
spread was measured could determine their monetary policy on their own; else it takes 
the value of 0. In principle, it would be desirable to take other forms of urban influence 
on the territorial supply of money into account, too, that is, to introduce for example a 
dummy that captures the urban control of the standard of the princely coinage. However, 
in many cases it is impossible to know for how long the agreements were in force, 
which gave cities the right to supervise the rulers’ mint. By contrast, determining 
whether a town had acquired the right to issue its own coinage is easy, last but not least 
because there is physical evidence in the form of urban coins that can be dated more or 
less closely.  
There are a number of further variables that need to be taken into account. Thus, 
integration studies usually stress the importance of transportation costs. Whether and to 
what extent these costs fell during the period here considered is not clear. On the one 
hand, van der Wee (1963, p. 327) points to technical innovations in maritime transport, 
which imply that costs fell. Menard (1991), on the other hand, argues that a ‘transport 
revolution’ did not take place, fright charges in the eighteenth century being only 
slightly lower than in the high Middle Ages. As for overland transport, Munro (2001, p. 
27) claims that due to an increase in peace and security and to organisational 
innovations such as the emergence of specialised cartage firms, the costs of overland 
transport probably decreased from at least the middle of the fifteenth century onwards. 
According to Spufford (Spufford, 2002, p. 19), however, cartage firms were an essential 
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component of the commercial revolution of the high Middle Ages, being thus long in 
place by the fourteenth century. Also, while in Western Europe peace and security may 
have increased with the end of the Hundred Years’ War, in Central Europe the 100 
years after 1450 were not necessarily more peaceful than the 100 years before. In view 
of these uncertainties and due to the favourable weight-value ratio of hard money 
transport costs must have been comparatively low anyway, it seems best to omit this 
factor. 
Normally one would expect the degree of integration between financial markets to be 
positively correlated to the volume of trade between these markets. In gravity models 
that are employed to predict trade volumes between modern countries, distance – 
commonly between national capitals – is used as a standard component, others being 
variables such as the gross national product. There are two reasons why such a model 
cannot be employed in the present context: For one thing, data which could be used to 
estimate GNP have not been preserved, and for another, late medieval princely 
territories were no modern national states, lacking essential characteristics such as 
governments invested with a monopoly of force and clearly defined borders. Hence, 
even if there were sufficient data to estimate GNP, it would be impossible to determine 
exactly to which area these data apply. However, the assumption that trade volumes and 
market integration were positively correlated in the late Middle Ages is still plausible. 
As in this study the units of analysis are not national states but rather cities, a proxy is 
needed that captures their involvement in long-distance trade. Lacking better data, it 
should be possible to use their population for this purpose. Still, population figures for 
the 25 cities analysed here are incomplete at best, having for most of them been 
estimated for specific years, which are usually decades apart. Interpolating the missing 
data is unavoidable. Having done that, and making the assumption that the volume of 
trade between two cities was positively correlated with the log of their population and 
negatively to the log of the distance between them, it is possible to construct a variable 
that can be used as a proxy for trade. There should be a negative correlation between 
this variable and the spreads between the local gold-silver ratios. 
A number of the cities covered by this analysis were using the same silver currency, 
which was either supplied by themselves (in case of a currency union) or by their feudal 
overlord. Whereas today, there are no deviations between exchange rates within a 
currency area, this was not the case between the fourteenth and the sixteenth centuries. 
For example, the price of the Rhinegulden might be different in Luebeck and Hamburg 
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even though the same silver currency, the Mark of Luebeck, was used in both cities. 
Still, one would expect spreads between local gold-silver ratios to be smaller in cases 
where both places had the same silver currency than if different silver currencies were 
used. Hence, it is necessary to include currency unions into the analysis. This can be 
done by creating a dummy that takes the value of 1 if both cities had the same currency 
in the year when the spread between the ratios was observed, and 0 if they had different 
currencies. The dummy and the spreads should be negatively correlated. 
Further, the influence of infrastructure needs to taken into account. Important 
differences in the quality of the roads linking the cities here considered probably did not 
exist, but it is well known that using roads was more expensive than sea transport. This 
difference can be captured by introducing an infrastructure dummy, which is 1 if both 
cities had a port, and else 0. Here, there should also be a negative correlation with the 
spreads between the local ratios. A similar dummy is used to capture the effects of 
navigable rivers, on which both cities lay.  
Finally, language could have had an influence on the integration of financial markets, 
since speaking a similar idiom reduced transaction costs and therefore improved market 
efficiency. German as a national language began to develop only toward the very end of 
the period analysed here. Generally, in the Hanseatic cities Low German was still 
spoken, a language that was closer to Dutch than to the dialects of Upper Germany. 
Other languages spoken in cities here considered were French, English and Polish. The 
effect of having the same or a very similar language is captured by introducing a final 
dummy which in this case takes the value of 1, and is 0 if languages in the two cities 
between which a spread in the gold-silver ratio were different. As usual in integration 
analyses which use data from multiple localities (cf. Ritschl and Wolf, 2003), the model 
takes the form of a panel analysis. A hausman-test indicates that a random-effects 
regression is appropriate. This equation is used: 
log(Δ) = β1(autonomy) + β2(trade) + β3(union) + β4(port) + β5(river) + β6(language) + c 
Table 2 gives the results for a number of tests where variables are consecutively added.  
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Table 2: Regression results (Panel analysis, whole period, different variables) 
 logspread logspread logspread logspread logspread logspread 
autonomy -0.471 -0.453 -0.467 -0.482 -0.485 -0.491 
 (4.65)** (4.07)** (4.30)** (4.33)** (4.22)** (4.27)** 
trade  -0.100 -0.019 -0.011 -0.012 -0.009 
  (1.81) (0.32) (0.18) (0.20) (0.15) 
union   -0.763 -0.747 -0.745 -0.791 
   (3.11)** (3.03)** (3.01)** (3.14)** 
port    -0.103 -0.103 -0.089 
    (0.61) (0.61) (0.52) 
river     0.014 0.017 
     (0.07) (0.09) 
language      0.120 
      (1.02) 
Constant 0.365 0.762 0.467 0.451 0.455 0.405 
 (5.79)** (3.15)** (1.84) (1.77) (1.77) (1.54) 
Observations 1993 1890 1890 1890 1890 1890 
Number of city-pairs 183 165 165 165 165 165 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
The analysis reveals that over the whole period here considered, i.e. 1352 to 1562, urban 
autonomy with regard to monetary policies had a strong and highly significant negative 
influence on the spreads between local gold-silver ratios. The autonomy-coefficient and 
its significance remain practically unchanged, regardless of how many other variables 
are included. This finding increases confidence in the regression results and confirms 
the central hypothesis of the present paper: Financial markets between cities that issued 
their own currencies were much better integrated and more efficient than markets 
between cities whose currencies were supplied by some outside ruler. 
As for the other variables, trade has the expected negative sign – that is, the larger its 
volume was, the smaller spreads between local gold-silver ratios became –, but the 
coefficient is insignificant. This may be due to the fact that city sizes and distances 
between them are not sufficient to predict trade volumes, which may have depended on 
any number of further influences. In fact, it is known that there were comparatively 
large cities where trade played a relatively minor role, such as for example Bamberg, 
while a number of fairs that were established in the early fifteenth century and that 
quickly gained more than just regional importance were located at small towns, such as 
Petronell in Austria (Epstein, 1994, p. 464). In sixteenth-century North Germany, 
important financial fairs emerged at such remote places as Kiel in modern Schleswig-
Holstein and Stolp in Pomerania, which were otherwise totally insignificant in 
international commerce (Petersen, 1980). In contrast to trade, the union-variable has a 
highly significant influence on market efficiency, which is even stronger than the one of 
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urban autonomy. Evidently, having the same silver currency was the single most 
important factor that fostered the integration of financial markets. As expected, the port-
dummy has a negative influence on spreads between local gold-silver ratios, but the 
coefficient is insignificant. Probably, due to the favourable weight-value ratio of gold 
and silver transport costs were so low that it really did not matter if a city had a port or 
was landlocked. The river-dummy is likewise insignificant; its positive sign might be 
due to the fact that traffic along rivers was actually easier to control and to tax than road 
traffic. The influence of language, finally, was also insignificant. 
The analysis presented above reveals that there was a close correlation between urban 
autonomy and market integration, but leaves open the question of causalities. In other 
words, it does not tell whether market integration and efficiency improved due to the 
grant of the right of coinage to a city, or whether cities, whose financial markets were 
relatively efficient from the start, acquired monetary autonomy more often than cities 
whose markets were less efficient. It is possible to approach a solution to the problem 
by defining another dummy. This receives the value of 1 if both cities in a city-pair 
gained the right of coinage at some later date during the period of time here considered, 
and the value of 0 if at least one city remained subject to the monetary policies of a 
feudal lord over the whole period. If cities with well integrated and efficient financial 
markets tended to acquire monetary autonomy, the coefficient for the dummy should be 
negative, indicating small spreads between the urban gold-silver ratios. By contrast, a 
positive coefficient shows that markets between cities that gained their autonomy at 
some later date were, if anything, less efficient than markets between cities that never 
issued their own currency. The following table contains the results: 
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Table 3: Regression results with a later-autonomy dummy as independent variable 
(Panel analysis, whole period) 
 logspread logspread logspread logspread logspread logspread 
lateraut 0.691 0.692 0.715 0.717 0.713 0.707 
 (4.83)** (4.28)** (4.48)** (4.46)** (4.42)** (4.35)** 
trade  -0.111 -0.032 -0.030 -0.022 -0.023 
  (1.99)* (0.53) (0.49) (0.36) (0.36) 
union   -0.744 -0.740 -0.736 -0.749 
   (2.99)** (2.95)** (2.92)** (2.91)** 
Port    -0.025 -0.039 -0.034 
    (0.15) (0.23) (0.20) 
river     -0.134 -0.133 
     (0.70) (0.69) 
language      0.039 
      (0.32) 
Constant 0.146 0.604 0.308 0.305 0.287 0.275 
 (2.61)** (2.42)* (1.18) (1.16) (1.08) (1.01) 
Observations 1993 1890 1890 1890 1890 1890 
Number of city-pairs 183 165 165 165 165 165 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
The results indicate that the hypothesis that market efficiency led to autonomy in 
matters of monetary policy can be excluded. If the temporal order of developments 
reveals anything about causalities, it seems to be obvious that a higher degree of market 
efficiency was the consequence of autonomy, and not its cause. Merchants who 
conducted business on the money market apparently trusted the monetary policies 
pursued by cities rather than those practiced by feudal lords. Hence, granting a city the 
right to strike its own coins was a way how a ruler could credibly commit to 
maintaining monetary stability. Feudal lords based the authorization of cities to issue a 
currency on rational expectations of an improved performance of the markets. As for the 
effect on the princely revenues, data about their development during these centuries are 
so sketchy than it is impossible to determine whether they grew due to the establishment 
of urban autonomy in monetary matters, but it is likely that at least the income from 
market dues and customs increased. 
Instead of analysing the whole period of time between the middle of the fourteenth and 
the second half of the sixteenth century, it is informative to split the data-set into several 
periods. A plausible divide would be the years around 1460-70 when large new lodes of 
silver were discovered in the mining districts of Saxony and the Tyrol, and when the 
long upward trend of prices that was to continue through the whole sixteenth and into 
the seventeenth century began. The following table presents the results. 
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Table 3: Regression results (Panel analysis, specific periods) 
 whole period to 1460 from 1461 
 logspread logspread Logspread 
autonomy -0.491 -0.567 -0.188 
 (4.27)** (3.80)** (0.93) 
trade -0.009 -0.020 0.139 
 (0.15) (0.26) (1.21) 
union -0.791 -0.652 -1.517 
 (3.14)** (2.21)* (3.08)** 
port -0.089 -0.054 -0.017 
 (0.52) (0.26) (0.06) 
river 0.017 0.238 -0.414 
 (0.09) (1.06) (1.30) 
language 0.120 0.153 0.035 
 (1.02) (1.06) (0.17) 
Constant 0.405 0.440 -0.337 
 (1.54) (1.36) (0.71) 
Observations 1890 1123 767 
Number of city-pairs 165 133 107 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
Interestingly, the positive influence of urban autonomy on the efficiency of financial 
markets became weaker and lost its significance after c. 1460. On the other hand, 
having the same currency became more important. Both developments may, actually, 
have been due to parallel outside influences, i.e. due to the transformation of the 
princely territories within the Holy Roman Empire into something that more nearly 
began to resemble a modern state. State-building went hand in hand with two 
developments which affected the performance of financial markets: on the one hand, 
urban autonomy was reduced, and on the other, rulers increasingly tried to banish 
foreign currencies from the territory they claimed to rule, or to enforce their circulation 
at politically imposed rates (cf. Konow, 1989, for Pomerania). The process increased the 
importance of having the same currency for the efficiency of financial markets. 
However, a detailed analysis of how state formation influenced market efficiency 
requires further research and is a task that is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. 
4. Conclusion 
The present study has a double aim: on the one hand to clarify whether and how rulers 
in the late medieval Holy Roman Empire were able to credibly commit to the 
preservation of monetary stability, and on the other hand to examine how their decisions 
affected the efficiency of financial markets. This commitment was important both for 
the long-term welfare of their subjects and for their princely revenues, as many feudal 
rulers realised. However, incentives not to commit or to violate a commitment once 
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made were strong. After all, under the conditions of a commodity money system such as 
that then existing, it was possible to reap a short-term and transient profit by increasing 
the seignorage by reducing – a procedure that required a reduction in the standard of the 
coinage and that therefore caused a rise in the price level in the medium and long term, 
i.e. as soon as consumers became aware of the debasement. As the need of a ruler to 
require short term funds was common knowledge, it was difficult to credibly commit to 
the preservation of monetary stability. 
To analyse this commitment situation, it is modelled as an instance of exchange 
between the ruler who provides a currency and the consumers who pay taxes and other 
dues, notably custom duties. Both sides of this market are linked by implicit contracts. 
For the ruler, reneging means secretly decreasing the standard of the coinage, for the 
consumers to evade taxes or customs or to refuse to accept the money locally supplied. 
In this context, two groups of consumers are distinguished: on the one hand, there are 
the ones who are able to acquire information about the bullion content of the coins 
which they handle at low costs. This group is primarily composed of merchants active 
in long-distance trade. On the other hand, there are consumers for whom the acquisition 
of this type of information is more costly; this group consists of practically everybody 
else. A further assumption is that both groups of consumers demand different kinds of 
money, merchants being interested in gold coins which they can use in large-scale 
transactions on international markets, while the others need silver for their local retail 
trade or for small day-to-day consumer transactions.  
As rulers and consumers interact not only once but repeatedly, and as interaction is 
usually open ended, reputation is potentially sufficient to ensure prolonged cooperation, 
i.e. to enable rulers credibly to commit to monetary stability. However, this is only the 
case if two conditions are given: First, information on a ruler’s defection must spread 
quickly among the consumers, and second, the consumers must have a chance to react 
to a ruler’s violation of the contract by reneging themselves. These conditions exist for 
the first group of consumers, i.e. for merchants. Merchants quickly notice any reduction 
in the standard of the coinage they demand, that is, in its content of fine gold, and are 
furthermore able either to exit the reneging ruler’s territory (thus evading taxes or 
customs) or to substitute local gold with gold supplied by more reliable producers 
abroad. Hence, reputation is sufficient to enable rulers credibly to commit to the 
stability of their gold coinage. In Shepsle’s (1991) words, commitment is motivationally 
credible because it is in the actor’s interest not to violate their implicit contract.  
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The conditions are not given as far as the second group of consumers is concerned, 
among whom changes in the standard of the silver coinage remain undetected for a 
longer period of time, and who have fewer chances to exit the ruler’s territory or to 
substitute his coinage with foreign silver money. Hence, credible commitment of the 
motivational kind is impossible in this situation. What is to be expected from this is that 
late medieval rulers would supply a relatively stable coinage in gold, but would reduce 
the standard of their silver coinage much more quickly. In fact, this is supported by the 
data. 
However, historically there were cases where long-distance merchants did demand 
silver money not only for large transactions but also for the business they conducted 
with local traders. In such cases, the exit of merchants unsatisfied with the locally 
supplied silver would provide rulers with an incentive credibly to commit themselves to 
the stability of their silver currency, but the incentive would be weak due to the rulers’ 
chance of finding consumers unable to notice debasements. In this situation, 
motivational credibility would not be given. Still, there was a solution: A ruler had to 
imperatively bind himself to the contract, that is, he had to find a way that made it 
impossible for him to renege. Transferring the right to issue the coinage to an 
independent authority was such a method. In the late Middle Ages, the independent 
authority would usually be a town. 
Feudal rulers could credibly commit to respecting the exclusive minting right that they 
had granted to a town because here, their defection would be immediately obvious. 
Urban authorities, too, had to credibly commit to the preservation of monetary stability. 
However, for them this was easier than for territorial rulers: They were governed by 
councils, whose members would not individually have benefited from reductions of the 
standard of the coinage. Furthermore, such reductions required an agreement among the 
council members which was costly to reach, and finally, councils were directly affected 
by urban unrest that was due to discontent with the coinage. A council’s commitment to 
the stability of their silver money was motivationally more credible than that of a prince. 
Consequently, cities debased their coinage less frequently than territorial rulers. Hence, 
there is no fundamental difference between motivational and imperative commitment or 
between reputational and institutional solutions to the problem of preserving monetary 
stability. In the last resort, imperative or institutional commitment would be credible 
because here, too, reputation was an effective mechanism to enforce compliance with 
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restraints on discretionary behaviour – restraints that the ruler imposed on himself either 
on his own or by involving another actor such as a city. 
As commitment refers to future behaviour, it generates trust if it is credible. Trust in the 
monetary polices of a council or a prince would, in turn, increase a merchant’s 
willingness to undertake business in that city or territory. Hence, it is to be expected that 
markets between localities whose silver money was supplied by an urban council would 
be better integrated and more efficient than markets whose money was provided by a 
feudal ruler. This hypothesis is tested by making use of a new method to analyse the 
integration of financial markets. The approach is based on linking exchange rate data to 
data on the money’s content of fine gold and fine silver, to use this information to 
construct local gold-silver ratios, and to interpret spreads between these local ratios as 
indicators of weak integration and market inefficiencies. The analysis covers data from 
25 cities from the Holy Roman Empire and the adjoining countries and from the time 
between 1352 and 1562. Due to incomplete time series, spreads between only 176 cities 
are measured; there is a total of about 2000 observations.  
The analysis confirms the hypothesis that urban monetary autonomy had a significant 
and negative impact on spreads between local gold-silver ratios. In other words, 
financial markets between cities that managed their coinage on their own were better 
integrated and more efficient than markets between cities whose money was supplied by 
a prince. Evidently, merchants trusted in urban rather than in princely monetary policies. 
Transferring the right of coinage to a city was, therefore, a way how a feudal ruler could 
credibly commit to the preservation of monetary stability.  
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